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CRUEL AND UNUSUAL BEFORE AND AFTER 2012: MILLER V. 
ALABAMA MUST APPLY RETROACTIVELY 
TRACY A. RHODES* 
In Miller v. Alabama,1 the United States Supreme Court declared that 
mandatory juvenile life without parole (“JLWOP”) sentencing schemes 
violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.2  
These schemes prohibited any discretion in sentencing and required “that 
each juvenile die in prison,” regardless of whether a defendant’s “youth and 
its attendant characteristics, along with the nature of his crime,” made a less 
severe sentence more suitable.3  In the three years since Miller, state and 
federal courts have come to different conclusions about whether the Miller 
Court’s ruling applies retroactively in the twenty-nine jurisdictions where 
mandatory JLWOP sentences were imposed.4  Approximately 2,500 
juveniles had been sentenced under such schemes,5 and their lives hang in 
the balance as courts address the issue of retroactivity. 
As one state supreme court noted, “[t]he primary point of dissension 
[regarding retroactivity] is whether the rule announced in Miller is 
substantive” or procedural.6  Retroactive application of Miller turns on this 
substantive/procedural dichotomy: if the rule is substantive, it must apply 
retroactively, but if the rule is procedural, it can only apply prospectively.7  
Because Miller created a substantive rule, courts considering challenges to 
                                                          
© 2015 Tracy A. Rhodes. 
  * The author wishes to thank the Maryland Law Review staff, particularly Megan Raker, 
Robert Baker, Susan Schipper, Alyssa Domzal, and Elizabeth Clark Rinehart, for their suggestions 
and superior Bluebooking; Professors Renée Hutchins and Lee Kovarksy for their insights and 
assistance; her parents, William and Kathy Rhodes, for their support and enthusiasm; and 
Jonathan Salmon for his unconditional love, patience, and encouragement. 
 1.  132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 2.  Id. at 2469.   
 3.  Id. at 2460. 
 4.  Compare, e.g., Jones v. Mississippi, 122 So.3d 698, 703 (Miss. 2013) (holding Miller 
created a substantive rule that must apply retroactively), with People v. Carp, 828 N.W.2d 685, 
709 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (finding Miller created a procedural rule that cannot apply 
retroactively). 
 5.  Joshua Rovner, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview, THE SENTENCING PROJECT 1 
(Apr. 2014), available at 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/jj_Juvenile%20Life%20Without%20Parole.pd
f [hereinafter JLWOP: An Overview].  
 6.  Nebraska v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 726 (Neb. 2014). 
 7.  See infra Part I.C. 
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mandatory JLWOP sentences should apply Miller retroactively to prevent 
the injustices of upholding unconstitutional sentences previously imposed 
upon juveniles.8 
Section I.A of this Comment examines the United States Supreme 
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.  Section I.B discusses the 
principal case, Miller v. Alabama, which establishes a substantive rule to be 
applied retroactively to cases on collateral review.  Retroactivity analysis is 
discussed generally in Section I.C.1, and specific state decisions regarding 
the retroactivity of Miller are reviewed in Section I.C.2.  In Section II.A, 
this Comment asserts that a thorough analysis of the substantive rule 
exception to non-retroactivity, as it has been modified over time, supports 
the conclusion that Miller created a substantive rule.  Section II.B explains 
the various reasons that Miller created a substantive rule that must apply 
retroactively.  Section II.C argues that concerns about finality and 
deterrence are irrelevant in the realm of juvenile sentencing because 
juveniles are unlikely to consider potential punishments before engaging in 
criminal behavior.  Finally, Section II.D discusses the Court’s recent 
acceptance of a certiorari petition to resolve the issue of Miller’s 
retroactivity. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A.  The Eighth Amendment Prohibits Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
The Eighth Amendment forbids the infliction of “cruel and unusual 
punishments”9 and requires the government to “respect the dignity of all 
persons.”10  The United States Supreme Court has two relevant strands of 
precedent concerning cruel and unusual punishments: proportional 
sentencing and individualized sentencing.11  Proportional sentencing 
mandates that a sentence fit the crime.12  These cases fall within two 
categories: challenges to the length of a sentence for a particular crime and 
challenges to a sentence based on the culpability of a specific class of 
                                                          
 8.  See infra Part II. 
 9.  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The amendment states, in full, that “[e]xcessive bail shall not 
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”  Id. 
 10.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005). 
 11.  The Miller Court explained, “The cases before us implicate two strands of precedent 
reflecting our concern with proportionate punishment.  The first has adopted categorical bans on 
sentencing practices based on mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders and the 
severity of a penalty.”  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2462 (2012).  The second “prohibit[s] 
mandatory imposition of capital punishment, requiring that sentencing authorities consider the 
characteristics of a defendant and the details of his offense before sentencing him to death.”  Id. at 
2462–63.  This Comment refers to the former as “proportional sentencing precedent” and the latter 
as “individualized sentencing precedent.” 
 12.  See infra Part I.A.1. 
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offenders.13  The other line of precedent, individualized sentencing, requires 
a sentencer to consider the personal characteristics and experiences unique 
to each criminal defendant before imposing a sentence.14  It is against this 
dual-strands-of-precedent backdrop that the Miller Court held mandatory 
JLWOP sentences cruel and unusual. 
1.  Proportional Sentencing Precedent: A Sentence’s Severity Must  
Correspond to the Culpability of a Class of Offenders and to the 
Gravity of the Offense 
The Eighth Amendment requires that a punishment be “graduated and 
proportioned to [the] offense”15 and forbids “grossly disproportionate” 
sentences.16  The concept of proportionality is not viewed “through a 
historical prism,” but rather, is analyzed “according to ‘the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’”17  
Under this standard, the United States Supreme Court has struck down as 
cruel and unusual a variety of punishments, such as a fifteen-year sentence 
of hard labor for falsifying a public document,18 ninety days imprisonment 
for narcotics addiction,19 a death sentence for rape,20 and, of relevance to 
this Comment, mandatory JLWOP sentences for any crime.21  
Proportionality cases generally fall within two categories: challenges to the 
length of a sentence and cases involving “categorical restrictions on the 
death penalty.”22 
                                                          
 13.  See infra Parts I.A.1.a–b. 
 14.  See infra Part I.A.2. 
 15.  Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910); see also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 
277, 284 (1983) (explaining a punishment is cruel and unusual if it is “disproportionate to the 
crime committed”). 
 16.  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59–60 (2010) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 
957, 997, 1000–01 (1991) (Kennedy, J. concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 17.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 
97, 102 (1976)). 
 18.  Weems, 217 U.S. at 362–63, 380–81.   
 19.  Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). 
 20.  Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). 
 21.   Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460. 
 22.  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2011). 
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a.  Challenges to the Length of a Sentence: Sentence Duration 
Must Correspond to the Severity of a Crime 
The first category of proportionality cases—challenges to the length of 
a sentence23—considers the duration of a criminal sentence compared to the 
seriousness of an offense to determine whether there is “an inference of 
gross disproportionality.”24  In considering the gravity of the offense, 
“[c]omparisons can be made in light of the harm caused . . . to the victim or 
society, and the culpability of the offender.”25  Next, courts must consider 
the defendant’s sentence in light of those given to similarly situated 
offenders26 in the same jurisdiction and those “imposed for the same crime 
in other jurisdictions.”27  If more severe offenses receive the same or less 
serious punishments, then the punishment in question may be excessive.28 
In Solem v. Helm,29 the Supreme Court applied this length-of-sentence 
analysis to consider the constitutionality of a life without parole sentence 
for writing a fraudulent check.30  The ordinary sentence for this crime was a 
maximum of five years imprisonment and a $5,000 fine, but under South 
Dakota’s recidivist statute, the defendant was sentenced to life without 
parole and received a $25,000 fine.31  The Helm Court explained the 
defendant received the second harshest sentence available, second only to 
the death penalty, despite engaging in “relatively minor criminal 
conduct.”32  The defendant received a harsher sentence than others in the 
state who committed “more serious crimes” and was treated “more harshly 
than he would have been in any other jurisdiction.”33  Therefore, the 
                                                          
 23.  The Court refers to this strand of proportionality cases as “length of term-of-years 
sentences,” but this Comment will discuss it as “challenges to the length of a sentence.”  See id. 
(referring to this line of precedent as “length of term-of-years sentences”). 
 24.  Graham, 560 U.S. at 60 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991) 
(Kennedy, J. concurring in part and concurring in judgment)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 25.  Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983); see id. at 292–94 (explaining “nonviolent 
crimes are less serious than crimes marked by violence” and that to determine the culpability of 
the offenders, courts can consider factors such as motive and intent). 
 26.  “Other offenders” include those who committed different offenses than the crime 
charged.  See id. at 291 (explaining the Court considers “more serious crimes” in its analysis). 
 27.  Graham, 560 U.S. at 60 (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J. concurring in 
part and concurring in judgment)); see also Helm, 463 U.S. at 290–92 (“First, we look to the 
gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty. . . . Second, it may be helpful to compare 
the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction. . . . Third, courts may find it 
useful to compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other 
jurisdictions.”). 
 28.  Helm, 463 U.S. at 291. 
 29.  463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
 30.  Id. at 281, 284, 291.  The defendant “utter[ed] a ‘no account’ check for $100.”  Id. at 281. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at 303. 
 33.  Id. 
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sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crime and violated the Eighth 
Amendment.34 
b.  The Eighth Amendment Requires Categorical Restrictions 
for Less Culpable Offenders 
The second category of proportionality cases—categorical challenges 
to a type of sentence—contemplates “the characteristics of the offender” 
and follows a two-pronged approach.35  Courts first determine the nation’s 
“contemporary values” by considering relevant state and federal 
legislation.36  This national consensus, while important, does not “‘wholly 
determine’” the outcome, however, as the Constitution requires the 
judiciary to determine whether a punishment is permitted by the Eighth 
Amendment.37  Therefore, proportionality analysis turns on a court’s own 
judgment regarding the constitutionality of the punishment.38  In this 
inquiry, courts consider an offender’s culpability, the severity of the 
punishment, and “whether the challenged sentencing practice serves 
legitimate penological goals.”39  These goals include: retribution, which 
provides that society can inflict punishment to express moral disapproval of 
                                                          
 34.  Id.  Helm was the first successful challenge to the length of a non-capital sentence since 
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) and was the only successful challenge between 1983 
and 2010 when Graham v. Florida was decided.  See, e.g., Robert Smith & G. Ben Cohen, 
Redemption Song: Graham v. Florida and the Evolving Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 108 
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 86, 87–89 (2010), available at 
http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1052&context=mlr_fi (“Following 
Robinson, the nine justices traded blows for the next three decades over the existence and scope of 
the proportionality principle in non-capital Eighth Amendment cases.  . . . [I]n Harmelin v. 
Michigan, . . . the Court expressly cabined the concept of excessiveness under the Eighth 
Amendment to its capital jurisprudence. However, in a separate concurring opinion, Justice 
Kennedy . . . concluded that ‘[t]he Eighth Amendment proportionality principle also applies to 
noncapital sentences.’ . . . [T]he approach articulated in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in 
Harmelin appears to have won the day in Graham.”).  This infrequency is likely because the Court 
has stated that successful proportionality challenges outside the capital context are “exceedingly 
rare.”  See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980) (“Outside the context of capital 
punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been 
exceedingly rare.”). 
 35.  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60–61 (2011).  More precisely, categorical-restrictions 
cases can be divided into two categories: “one considering the nature of the offense, the other 
considering the characteristics of the offender.”  Id. at 60.  Only the latter, however, is relevant to 
this Comment. 
 36.  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (“We have pinpointed that the ‘clearest and 
most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s 
legislatures.’”) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)).  
 37.  Id. at 312 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)). 
 38.  Id. at 313 (“[I]n cases involving a consensus, our own judgment is ‘brought to bear’ by 
asking whether there is reason to disagree with the judgment reached by the citizenry and its 
legislators.” (citation omitted) (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 597)). 
 39.  Graham, 560 U.S. at 67 (citing Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 441–46 (2008), 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571–72 (2005), and Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318–20). 
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a crime; deterrence, which states that the threat of punishment will prevent 
people from engaging in criminal activity; incapacitation, which seeks to 
remove a person from society to prevent that person from committing a 
future crime; and rehabilitation, which seeks to help an offender reenter 
society as a productive individual. 
Atkins v. Virginia,40 in which the Court considered the constitutionality 
of death sentences for developmentally disabled offenders,41 demonstrates 
this categorical restriction analysis. The Atkins Court first inquired into the 
nation’s “contemporary values” as reflected in federal and state 
legislation.42  In 1988, Congress forbade death sentences for such offenders, 
and by 2001, nineteen states also forbade the practice.43  The number of 
states prohibiting such sentences offered convincing evidence that modern 
society considered offenders with developmental disabilities to be 
“categorically less culpable than the average criminal.”44  Furthermore, the 
states allowing the practice rarely used it.45 
While the national consensus regarding the decency of a punishment is 
persuasive, it is ultimately the Court’s duty to determine a sentence’s 
constitutionality.46  The Atkins Court determined that its death penalty 
jurisprudence confirmed “the legislative consensus” that offenders with 
developmental disabilities “be categorically excluded from execution.”47  
The Court explained that the death penalty justifications of deterrence and 
retribution do not apply to the developmentally disabled.48  Furthermore, 
“[t]he reduced capacity” of offenders with developmental disabilities 
increases “[t]he risk ‘that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of 
factors which may call for a less severe penalty.’”49  Therefore, the Court 
concluded that the Eighth Amendment prohibits capital punishment for 
developmentally-disabled offenders.50 
                                                          
 40.  536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 41.  Id. at 310 (“[W]e granted certiorari to revisit the issue that we first addressed in the Penry 
case.”). 
 42.  Id. at 312 (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 331); see also id. at 314–16 (examining federal and 
state legislation). 
 43.  Id. at 314–15.  Those states include Georgia, Maryland, Kentucky, Tennessee, New 
Mexico, Arkansas, Colorado, Washington, Indiana, Kansas, New York, Nebraska, South Dakota, 
Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Missouri, and North Carolina.  Id. 
 44.  Id. at 315–16. 
 45.  Id. at 316. 
 46.  Id. at 312. 
 47.  Id. at 318. 
 48.  Id. at 318–20. 
 49.  Id. at 320 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)). 
 50.  Id. at 321. 
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Relying on Atkins, the Court later struck down death sentences for 
juvenile offenders in Roper v. Simmons.51  The Court identified several 
characteristics that made juveniles, like those with developmental 
disabilities, “‘categorically less culpable than the average criminal.’”52  The 
Court explained that juveniles are irresponsible and immature, are more 
easily persuaded by “negative influences and outside pressures,” and have 
“more transitory” personalities than adults.53  Like offenders with 
developmental disabilities, the “diminished culpability of juveniles” 
detracts from the punishment’s penological justifications of retribution and 
deterrence.54  Therefore, the Court found the Eighth Amendment prohibits 
the death penalty for all juvenile offenders.55 
c.  Graham v. Florida: The Court’s First Categorical Challenge 
to a Term-of-Years Sentence 
These proportional sentencing issues—challenges to the length of a 
sentence, and categorical challenges by a class of offenders—came to a 
head in Graham v. Florida.56  Prior to Graham, the Court had never 
prohibited a term of years sentence from being imposed on an entire class 
of offenders.57  The Graham Court specifically considered whether a life 
without parole sentence for a non-homicide juvenile offender violated the 
Constitution.58  As an issue of first impression, the Court determined that 
because “a sentencing practice itself is in question,” the proper analysis 
came from cases involving the categorical approach, such as Atkins and 
Roper.59  Therefore, the Court considered “objective indicia of society’s 
standards,” such as legislation and state practice, but was ultimately guided 
by “the Court’s own understanding and interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment’s text, history, meaning, and purpose.”60 
                                                          
 51.  543 U.S. 551, 563–64, 578 (2005). 
 52.  Id. at 567 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316). 
 53.  Id. at 569–70 (citing generally E. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968) and 
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)). 
 54.  Id. at 571–72; see id. at 571 (explaining that retribution is disproportionate when “the 
law’s most severe penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, 
to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity.”).  It is also highly unlikely that a 
juvenile engages in cost-benefit analysis before committing a crime, and therefore, “it is unclear 
whether the death penalty has a significant or even measurable deterrent effect on juveniles.”  Id.  
 55.  Id. at 578. 
 56.  560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010). 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. at 52–53. 
 59.  Id. at 61–62. 
 60.  Id. at 61 (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008) and Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 1008 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 74:1001 
Looking to the national consensus, the Court found only eleven 
jurisdictions actually imposed JLWOP sentences for non-homicide 
crimes.61  Twenty-six states, the District of Columbia, and the federal 
government did not impose such sentences, despite statutory authorization 
to do so.62  Therefore, the Court concluded, the nation viewed JLWOP 
sentences for non-homicide crimes contrary to modern standards of 
decency.63 
Under the next prong of the analysis—the Court’s own judgment—the 
Court considered “the culpability of the offenders at issue, . . . the severity 
of the punishment, . . . and whether the challenged sentencing practice 
serves legitimate penological goals.”64  Mirroring its discussion in Roper, 
the Court reiterated the differences between juveniles and adults, and found 
that, “compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile offender who did not kill or 
intend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability.”65  Next, the Court 
likened the severity of JLWOP to the death penalty, as both sentences deny 
the offender “the most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration.”66  
Because juveniles serve more time in prison than adult offenders, the Court 
explained that life without parole “is an especially harsh punishment for a 
juvenile.”67 
Turning to penological theories, the Court found the penal 
justifications of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation do 
not work for juvenile offenders.68  Retribution is inapplicable because 
juvenile offenders are less culpable than adults.69  Deterrence cannot be 
accomplished because juveniles are unlikely to consider potential 
punishments when deciding to act.70  Incapacitation is inappropriate 
because it requires a finding that “the juvenile is incorrigible,” but such 
                                                          
 61.  Id. at 64. 
 62.  Id.  
 63.  See id. at 67 (“The sentencing practice now under consideration is exceedingly rare.  And 
‘it is fair to say that a national consensus has developed against it.’” (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002)).   
 64.  Id. (citing Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 441–46, Roper, 543 U.S. at 571–72, and Atkins 536 U.S.  
at 318–20). 
 65.  Id. at 69.  The Graham Court also mentioned that “developments in psychology and brain 
science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.  For 
example, parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature through late 
adolescence.”  Id. at 68. 
 66.  Id. at 69–70 (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 300–01 (1983)). 
 67.  Id. at 70. 
 68.  Id. at 71–74. 
 69.  Id. at 71–72. 
 70.  Id. at 72. 
 2015] CRUEL AND UNUSUAL BEFORE AND AFTER 2012 1009 
“incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.”71  Finally, rehabilitation fails 
because a life without parole sentence “forswears altogether the 
rehabilitative ideal.”72  Juvenile offenders sentenced to life without parole 
are frequently denied access to rehabilitative services, despite the fact that 
juveniles are “most in need of and receptive to rehabilitation.”73  Because 
JLWOP for non-homicide crimes lacks “any legitimate penological 
justification,” it is inherently disproportionate.74  Therefore, the Graham 
Court held the sentencing practice at issue violated the Eighth 
Amendment.75 
2.  Individualized Sentencing Precedent: Consideration of 
Mitigating Factors Is Crucial to Capital Sentencing 
Determinations 
The Court’s individualized sentencing precedent, which involves a 
number of death penalty cases, is also vital to its Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence.76  The Court has previously stated that the death penalty is 
this country’s most severe punishment, followed by life without parole.77  
Because capital punishment is “qualitatively different” from a prison 
sentence, death must be the “appropriate punishment in [each] specific 
case.”78  As such, the consideration of individual factors in death penalty 
determinations is crucial, and mandatory imposition of the death penalty is 
unconstitutional.79 
                                                          
 71.  Id. at 72–73 (quoting Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W. 2d 374, 378 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 72.  Id. at 74. 
 73.  Id. (citing Brief for J. Lawrence Aber et al. as Amici Curiae at 28–31, Graham v. Florida, 
560 U.S. 48 (2010) (No. 08-7412)). 
 74.  Id. at 71 (“A sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature 
disproportionate to the offense.”). 
 75.  Id. at 82.  The Court also discussed international practices to further support its holding.  
See id. at 80 (explaining that international practices “are not dispositive as to the meaning of the 
Eighth Amendment,” but that these practices are also “not irrelevant” (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 
458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982) with internal quotation marks omitted).  Furthermore, while eleven 
nations allow JLWOP to be imposed, only two—the United States and Israel—ever impose such a 
punishment.). 
 76.  Because Graham compared JLWOP to the death penalty, the Miller Court considered this 
line of precedent as well. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2458 (2012) (“Graham further 
likened life without parole for juveniles to the death penalty, thereby evoking a second line of 
cases.  In those decisions, the Court has required sentencing authorities to consider the 
characteristics of a defendant and the details of the offense before sentencing him to death.”). 
 77.  Graham, 560 U.S. at 69 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). 
 78.  Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976). 
 79.  Id. at 304–05.  “Consideration of both the offender and the offense in order to arrive at a 
just and appropriate sentence has been viewed as a progressive and humanizing development.”  Id. 
at 304. 
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In addition to foreclosing mandatory capital punishment, the 
Constitution requires that mitigating factors be considered before imposing 
the death penalty.80  For example, in Eddings v. Oklahoma,81 a sixteen-
year-old defendant charged with first degree murder successfully 
challenged his death sentence by pointing to numerous factors his 
sentencing judge ignored.82  Although the sentencing judge considered the 
defendant’s youth as a mitigating factor, he failed to recognize that “youth 
is more than a chronological fact.”83  Youth is a vulnerable time in which “a 
person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological 
damage.”84  Therefore, evidence of a troublesome family history, a 
physically abusive father, and severe emotional disturbance “is particularly 
relevant” for mitigation.85  The case was remanded for the sentencing judge 
to consider all mitigating factors beyond the defendant’s chronological 
age.86 
B.  Miller v. Alabama Established That Mandatory Juvenile Life 
Without Parole Is Cruel and Unusual, and Therefore, Is 
Unconstitutional 
In Miller v. Alabama, the Court considered the situations of two 
fourteen-year-old offenders charged as adults and sentenced to mandatory 
JLWOP.87  Relying on its proportional sentencing and individualized 
sentencing precedents, the Court found mandatory JLWOP sentencing 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment88 
Looking to its proportional sentencing precedent, the Court found that 
juveniles, as a class of offenders, have lesser culpability and “greater 
prospects for reform” than adults.89  Reiterating the observations of the 
                                                          
 80.  See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (“[W]e conclude that 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer . . . not be precluded from 
considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the 
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”). 
 81.  455 U.S. 104 (1982). 
 82.  Id. at 107–09.  
 83.  Id. at 115. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. at 117. 
 87.  The first, Kuntrell Jackson, was charged as an adult with capital felony murder and 
aggravated robbery.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2461 (2012).  Per Arkansas law, upon 
conviction, he was sentenced to life without parole.  Id.  The second, Evan Miller, was charged as 
an adult with murder in the course of arson.  Id. at 2462–63.  As per Alabama law, he was also 
sentenced to life without parole.  Id. at 2463. 
 88.  Id. at 2463–64. 
 89.  Id. at 2464 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2011)); see also id. at 2458 (“Two 
strands of precedent reflecting the concern with proportionate punishment come together here.”). 
 2015] CRUEL AND UNUSUAL BEFORE AND AFTER 2012 1011 
Roper and Graham Courts, the Miller Court explained that there are 
scientifically-proven differences between juvenile and adult brains.90  
Juveniles lack maturity, are more susceptible to harmful influences and peer 
pressure, have little control over their environments, and are unable to 
remove themselves from “horrific, crime-producing settings.”91  
Furthermore, their personalities are “less fixed” than adults’, and their 
conduct is “less likely to be ‘evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].’”92  
These differences between juveniles and adults weaken penological 
justifications, as discussed by the Graham Court.93  Thus, the Court 
concluded, mandatory life without parole is uniquely disproportionate to all 
juvenile offenders.94 
Relying on the Graham Court’s comparison of JLWOP to the death 
penalty, the Court next turned to its individualized sentencing precedent.95  
This line of cases struck down mandatory capital punishment for 
disregarding an offender’s “character and record” and ignoring the 
circumstances surrounding a crime.96  Similarly, mandatory JLWOP 
sentences fail to consider “the mitigating qualities of youth.”97  These 
qualities include a defendant’s “chronological age,” as well as one’s 
upbringing and “mental and emotional development.”98  By disregarding 
the qualities of youth, a mandatory sentencing scheme “poses too great a 
risk of disproportionate punishment.”99  Therefore, like mandatory 
imposition of the death penalty, mandatory JLWOP violates the Eighth 
Amendment.100 
The dissenting justices argued that “most States” sentence juveniles to 
mandatory JLWOP, and therefore, the punishment is not “unusual” for 
purposes of the Eighth Amendment.101  The majority countered this 
argument by explaining that most states impose mandatory JLWOP 
“through the combination of two independent statutory provisions”—one 
                                                          
 90.  Id. (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 68). 
 91.  Id. (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)). 
 92.  Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 93.  See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text. 
 94.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 
 95.  Id. at 2467 (“Graham’s [t]reat[ment] [of] juvenile life sentences as analogous to capital 
punishment makes relevant here a second line of our precedents, demanding individualized 
sentencing when imposing the death penalty.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 96.  Id. (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)). 
 97.  Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 98.  Id. (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982)). 
 99.  Id. at 2469. 
 100.  Specifically, the Court stated, “[T]he Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme 
that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.”  Id. 
 101.  Id. at 2478 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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permitting transfer of a juvenile to adult court and one prescribing penalties 
for those tried there.102  The majority posited that legislatures may not have 
intended the harsh consequences that result from these statutes.103  When 
these statutes interact, there is no “separate penalty provision[] for . . . 
juvenile offenders,” many of whom are automatically transferred to adult 
court, without individualized considerations.104  When discretion is 
permitted, it often belongs to the prosecutor and lacks judicial oversight.105  
In the rare instances when judges can intervene, they often have limited 
information, so these oversight mechanisms have “limited utility.”106  
Ultimately, the Court explained, judicial discretion regarding juvenile 
transfer to adult court, when available, “cannot substitute for discretion at 
post-trial sentencing in adult court—and so cannot satisfy the Eighth 
Amendment.”107  Therefore, the dissent’s argument did not sway the 
majority’s finding that mandatory JLWOP is cruel and unusual. 
C.  New Substantive Rules and Watershed Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Must Be Applied Retroactively to Cases on Collateral Review 
In 2012, Miller v. Alabama outlawed mandatory JLWOP sentencing 
schemes in twenty-nine jurisdictions.108  Since Miller was decided, courts 
have differed on whether the rule applies retroactively to the thousands of 
juveniles sentenced under these schemes.109  Many of these courts engaged 
in a similar analysis by following Teague v. Lane’s110 “non-retroactivity 
doctrine,” but their conclusions have been inconsistent.111 
1.  Teague’s Non-Retroactivity Doctrine 
Retroactivity analysis has changed significantly over the past five 
decades.  In 1965, Linkletter v. Walker112 announced the first test to 
determine whether a new constitutional rule applies retroactively.  The 
                                                          
 102.  Id. at 2472 (majority opinion). 
 103.  Id. at 2472–73. 
 104.  Id. at 2473–74. 
 105.  Id. at 2474. 
 106.  Id.  
 107.  Id. at 2475. 
 108.  Id. at 2471, 2475; see also Joshua Rovner, Slow to Act: State Responses to 2012 Supreme 
Court Mandate on Life Without Parole, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, 1, available at 
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/jj_State_Responses_to_Miller.pdf [hereinafter Slow 
to Act]. 
 109.  The Sentencing Project estimates that more than 2,500 juveniles had been sentenced 
under mandatory JLWOP sentencing schemes.  Slow to Act, supra note 108, at 4. 
 110.  489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
 111.  See supra note 4. 
 112.  381 U.S. 618 (1965). 
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Linkletter analysis required courts to “weigh the merits and demerits in each 
case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and 
effect, and whether retrospective [application] will further or retard its 
operation.”113  Linkletter proved to be problematic, however, and Justice 
Harlan proposed a new retroactivity test in his dissenting opinion in Desist 
v. United States114 and his concurring opinion in Mackey v. United States.115  
Justice Harlan declared that cases on direct review should always benefit 
from retroactive application of new rules.116  However, cases on collateral 
review—including “‘any form of post-conviction relief other than a direct 
appeal’”117—should only benefit from retroactive application of new rules 
in two instances.118  Justice Harlan’s first exception for cases on collateral 
review covers “‘[n]ew substantive due process rules,’ that is, those that 
place . . . certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the 
power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.”119  Justice 
Harlan’s second exception includes procedural rules that “are ‘implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty.’”120 
In Teague v. Lane, the Court adopted Justice Harlan’s test121 with two 
minor caveats.  First, while the Teague plurality adopted Justice Harlan’s 
first exception to retroactivity—rules that place “‘certain kinds of primary, 
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making 
authority to proscribe’”—the Court did not explicitly label this exception as 
covering substantive rules.122  However, Justice Harlan’s language in 
Mackey explained that rules governing primary conduct are substantive.123  
Second, the Teague plurality specified that Justice Harlan’s second 
exception—procedural rules that are fundamental to the concept of ordered 
liberty—referred to “watershed rules of criminal procedure.”124  The same 
                                                          
 113.  Id. at 629. 
 114.  394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“I can no longer, however, remain 
content with the doctrinal confusion that has characterized our efforts to apply the basic Linkletter 
principle.  ‘Retroactivity’ must be rethought.”).   
 115.  401 U.S. 667, 681 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).  
 116.  Id. (“I continue to believe that a proper perception of our duties as a court of law . . . 
mandates that we apply the law as it is at the time, not as it once was.”). 
 117.  Wall v. Kholi, 131 S. Ct. 1278, 1284 (2011) (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.090(2) 
(2008)).  
 118.  Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692–93 (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 119.  Id. at 692. 
 120.  Id. at 693 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). 
 121.  Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (plurality opinion) (“[W]e now adopt Justice 
Harlan’s view of retroactivity for cases on collateral review.”). 
 122.  Id. at 307, 310 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692). 
 123.  See Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 124.  Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (plurality opinion). 
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year Teague was decided, the Court in Penry v. Lynaugh125 clarified 
Teague’s first exception by explaining that a new rule removing a class of 
individuals from the State’s criminal law-making authority “is analogous to 
a new rule placing certain conduct beyond the State’s power to punish.”126  
Thus, Teague’s substantive rule exception includes rules excusing primary 
conduct from criminal punishment, as well as rules that eliminate a type of 
punishment “for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.”127 
Modern retroactivity analysis follows the Teague plurality’s 
framework, as clarified in Penry.128  To have retroactive effect, a 
constitutional rule must be new, in that it “breaks new ground or imposes a 
new obligation on the States or the Federal Government.”129  A rule is new 
if precedent did not require the outcome “at the time the defendant’s 
conviction became final.”130  To apply retroactively to cases on collateral 
review, this new rule must be either substantive or a watershed rule of 
criminal procedure.131  Years after Penry, the Court in Schriro v. 
Summerlin132 confirmed that substantive rules are those “that place 
particular conduct or persons covered by the statute beyond the State’s 
power to punish.”133  As the Schriro Court explained, these substantive 
rules apply retroactively because they “necessarily carry a significant risk 
that a defendant . . . faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon 
him.”134  Watershed rules of criminal procedure, on the other hand, 
“implicat[e] the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal 
proceeding.”135 
                                                          
 125.  492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
 126.  Id. at 330. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  See, e.g., Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 494–95 (1990) (citations omitted) (citing Teague, 
489 U.S. at 311; Penry, 492 U.S. at 329, 330) (“The first [non-retroactivity] exception permits the 
retroactive application of a new rule if the rule places a class of private conduct beyond the power 
of the State to proscribe . . .  or addresses a ‘substantive categorical guarante[e] accorded by the 
Constitution,’ such as a rule ‘prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of 
defendants because of their status or offense.’” (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 330)). 
 129.  Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (plurality opinion) (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 62 
(1987)). 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351–52 (2004).  
 132.  542 U.S. 348 (2004). 
 133.  Id. at 351–52 (citing Saffle, 494 U.S. at 494–95; Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (plurality 
opinion)). 
 134.  Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352 (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 135.  Id. (quoting Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Because this 
Comment argues that Miller v. Alabama’s rule falls under the substantive rule exception, this 
Comment will not discuss watershed rules of criminal procedure further.  
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2.  The Supreme Court’s Retroactivity Jurisprudence as Applied to 
the States 
The Teague doctrine does not “limit the authority of a state court, 
when reviewing its own state criminal convictions, to provide a remedy for 
a violation that is deemed ‘nonretroactive’ under Teague.”136  Teague 
involved a federal habeas corpus issue, and was designed to “minimiz[e] 
federal intrusion into state criminal proceedings.”137  Though states are not 
required to follow the Teague analysis, many choose to do so.138 
a.  A Minority of Courts Have Found Miller to be Procedural 
and Have Refused to Apply It Retroactively 
The Eleventh Circuit and highest state courts in Pennsylvania, 
Louisiana, and Minnesota, as well as some lower state and federal courts, 
have held that Miller does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral 
review.139  Although some of these courts turned to state precedents that 
resemble Linkletter v. Walker,140 many relied heavily on Teague v. Lane.141  
For example, the Supreme Court of Minnesota expressed the need for a 
“bright-line rule for when relief is to be retroactive” and looked to Teague 
to provide such a rule.142  Other courts with similar positions especially 
focused on Teague’s language that retroactivity “seriously undermines the 
principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal 
                                                          
 136.  Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 282 (2008). 
 137.  Id. at 280. 
 138.  See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 8 (Pa. 2013) (“This Court, however, 
generally has looked to the Teague doctrine in determining retroactivity of new federal 
constitutional rulings.”); see also Ex Parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66, 70–71 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2014) (“Although the United States Supreme Court held in Danforth v. Minnesota that state courts 
need not utilize the Teague retroactivity rule, we follow Teague as a general matter of state habeas 
corpus . . . .”). 
 139.  See Ex Parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d at 71, n.20 (listing courts that have not applied Miller 
retroactively); In re Morgan, 717 F.3d 1186, 1189 (11th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the notion that 
Miller should apply retroactively); Chambers v. Minnesota, 831 N.W.2d 311, 331 (Minn. 2013) 
(same); Louisiana v. Tate, 130 So.3d 829, 841 (La. 2013) (same); Cunningham, 81 A.3d at 9 
(same). 
 140.  In considering the retroactivity of Miller, Florida and Michigan courts considered: “(a) 
the purpose to be served by the new rule; (b) the extent of reliance on the old rule; and (c) the 
effect on the administration of a retroactive application of the new rule.”  Geter v. Florida, 115 
So.3d 375, 378 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922, 926 (Fla. 1980)); 
see also Michigan v. Carp, 828 N.W.2d 685 713–14 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (implementing the 
same test).  Both courts found the Miller rule to be procedural and declined to apply it 
retroactively.  Geter, 115 So.3d at 384–85; Carp, 828 N.W.2d at 723. 
 141.  See, e.g., Tate, 130 So.3d 829, 834 (La. 2013) (“[O]ur analysis is directed by the Teague 
inquiry.”); Carp, 828 N.W.2d at 709 (“If, however, Miller’s new rule is procedural only and fails 
to meet any of the delineated Teague exceptions, then we cannot apply it retroactively . . . .).  
 142.  Chambers, 831 N.W.2d at 324. 
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justice system.  Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its 
deterrent effect.”143 
Walking through the Teague analysis, most courts in this camp 
conceded that Miller announced a new rule.144  However, these courts found 
the Miller rule to be procedural for a number of reasons.  First, the rule did 
not implement a categorical ban,145 but rather, imposed a “[t]argeted 
prohibition[].”146  Because the Miller Court focused solely on mandatory 
sentencing schemes and did not foreclose JLWOP sentences altogether, 
these courts found the rule to be procedural.147  Second, as the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania explained, Miller “does not place any conduct 
beyond the State’s power to punish,” and therefore, it cannot fit into the 
first Teague exception to nonretroactivity.148  Finally, in mandating a 
sentencer to consider a defendant’s “youth and attendant characteristics,” 
these courts argued that Miller did not announce an obligation that is “the 
functional equivalent of an element.”149  Because Miller did not alter the 
                                                          
 143.  Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989); see, e.g., In re Morgan, 717 F.3d 1186, 1190 
(11th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he distinction between substantive and procedural rules reflects the interest 
of the state and federal courts in the finality of judgments.” (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 308)); 
Chambers, 831 N.W.2d at 324 (“[W]e have consistently recognized the need to safeguard the 
important principles underlying the [Teague] doctrine, including finality . . . .”). 
 144.  See, e.g., Tate, 130 So.3d at 835 (“[W]e find, and the parties do not dispute, Miller 
establishes a new rule.”); Carp, 828 N.W.2d at 708 (“[I]t is uncontested that Miller falls within the 
definition of a ‘new rule’ because it ‘was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the 
defendant’s conviction became final.”) (quoting Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 418 (2007)); 
Chambers, 831 N.W.2d at 325 (“The parties do not dispute that Miller announced a new 
rule . . . .”). 
 145.  Tate, 130 So.3d at 837 (“[Miller] did not alter the range of conduct or persons subject to 
life imprisonment without parole for homicide offenses, nor did it eliminate a State’s power to 
impose such a sentence on a juvenile offender . . . .”); Cunningham, 81 A.3d at 10 (“[B]y its own 
terms, the Miller holding ‘does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders . . . .’”) 
(quoting Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 (2012)). 
 146.  Carp, 828 N.W.2d at 710 (explaining the Miller rule is procedural because “it mandates 
only that a sentence follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant 
characteristics—before imposing a particular penalty.  Targeted prohibitions are by definition less 
restrictive than a categorical ban.”) (footnote and citation omitted) (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 
2471) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 147.  In re Morgan, 717 F.3d at 1189  (“[T]he Supreme Court made clear that its decision 
‘d[id] not foreclose a sentencer’s ability to make t[he] judgment [that a juvenile offender should 
be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole] in homicide cases.”) (quoting 
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469); Chambers, 831 N.W.2d at 328 (“[T]he [Miller] rule . . . does not 
eliminate the power of the State to impose the punishment of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of release upon a juvenile offender who has committed a homicide offense.”); Tate, 
130 So.3d at 837; Cunningham, 81 A.3d at 10. 
 148.  Cunningham, 81 A.3d at 10 (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471); see also Carp, 828 
N.W.2d at 711 (“[T]he [Miller] ruling does not place ‘certain kinds of primary, private individual 
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.’” (quoting Teague, 
489 U.S. at 307)). 
 149.  Chambers, 831 N.W.2d at 329 (quoting Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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elements necessary for a homicide conviction, these courts found it did not 
create a substantive change in the law.150  For the above reasons, these 
courts held that the new rule announced in Miller is procedural and cannot 
apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. 
b. Most Courts Considering the Issue Have Applied Miller 
Retroactively to Cases on Collateral Review 
Most other courts, on both the federal and state levels, have found 
Miller to be a substantive rule that must apply retroactively to cases on 
collateral review.  The First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits 
found habeas applicants made a prima facie case that Miller applies 
retroactively,151 and thus, have granted motions to file habeas corpus 
petitions on Miller grounds.152  Habeas is available if “the claim relies 
on . . . a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on 
collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously 
unavailable.”153  By allowing these habeas petitions to proceed, these courts 
recognized that Miller created a substantive rule that should apply 
retroactively.  On the state level, offenders previously sentenced to 
mandatory JLWOP can seek post-conviction relief.  Post-conviction is a 
state form of collateral review that mirrors habeas relief in the federal 
system, though its requirements vary by state.  Considering post-conviction 
petitions raising Miller claims, supreme courts in Mississippi, 
                                                          
 150.  Carp, 828 N.W.2d at 711; see Chambers, 831 N.W.2d at 329 (“[T]he Miller rule does not 
announce a new ‘element.’”); see also Tate, 130 So.3d at 837 (“[I]t did not alter the elements 
necessary for a homicide conviction.  Rather, it simply altered the range of permissible methods 
for determining whether a juvenile could be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for 
such a conviction . . . .” (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471)). 
 151.  A person who is “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court” can seek relief 
through habeas corpus if his or her incarceration violates the Constitution or federal law.  28 
U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2012).  Most circuits require a defendant to show “possible merit to warrant a 
fuller exploration by the district court” to establish a prime facie case.  Johnson v. United States, 
720 F.3d 720, 720 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Bennett v. United States, 119 F.3d 468, 469 (7th Cir. 1997); see also In re Pendleton, 732 F.3d 
280, 282 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (quoting Goldblum v. Klem, 510 F.3d 204, 220 (3d Cir. 
2007) (“Under our precedent, a ‘prima facie showing’ in this context merely means ‘a sufficient 
showing of possible merit to warrant a fuller exploration by the district court.’”) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  
 152.  See Ex Parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66, 71, 71 n.21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (naming the 
circuit courts granting habeas petitions); Evans-Garcia v. United States, 744 F.3d 235, 236 (1st 
Cir. 2014) (certifying Evans-Garcia’s habeas petition raising a Miller claim); Wang v. United 
States, No. 13-2426 (2d Cir. July 16, 2013); Pendleton, 732 F.3d at 282–83 (per curiam) (“[W]e 
conclude that Petitioners have made a prima facie showing that Miller is retroactive.  In doing so, 
we join several of our sister courts of appeals.”); In re James, No. 12-287 (4th Cir. May 10, 2013); 
Johnson, 720 F.3d at 720 (internal citation omitted) (finding petitioner made a prima facie case 
that Miller created a new rule that was previously unavailable). 
 153.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(i) (2012). 
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Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Iowa have found that Miller applies 
retroactively to cases on collateral review.154 
Following the Teague analysis, these courts asked first whether Miller 
announced a new rule, and second whether the new rule was substantive or 
procedural.  Each of these courts determined that Miller created a new 
rule.155  Most found the rule to be substantive because it “explicitly 
forecloses the imposition of a certain category of punishment . . . on a 
specific class of defendants,”156 and thus, “narrow[ed] the scope of a 
criminal statute.”157  These courts particularly focused on Schriro’s 
language that substantive rules “apply retroactively because they 
necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant . . . faces a punishment 
that the law cannot impose upon him.”158 
Two courts have found that Miller did not announce a purely 
substantive rule, but held the rule still applies retroactively.  The Superior 
Court of New Hampshire explained Miller has both substantive and 
procedural elements in that it “affects a particular class of persons” and 
“mandates a process that may lead to the same outcome.”159  Despite 
Miller’s procedural elements, the court found the scales tipped in favor of 
Miller announcing a substantive rule because “it alters the range of . . . 
punishments that may be imposed on juvenile homicide offenders.”160  
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Nebraska stated that the Miller rule “does 
not neatly fall into the existing definitions of either a procedural rule or a 
                                                          
 154.  Iowa v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 122 (Iowa 2013); Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for 
Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 281 (Mass. 2013); Jones v. Mississippi, 122 So.3d 698, 703 (Miss. 
2013); Nebraska v. Mantich, 824 N.W.2d 716, 731 (Neb. 2014). 
 155.  See, e.g., Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 278–79 (explaining that prior to Miller, “judicial 
precedent did not compel a conclusion that it was unconstitutional to impose a mandatory 
sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole on a juvenile homicide offender.”); 
Jones, 122 So.3d at 702 (explaining that when Miller held mandatory JLWOP sentencing schemes 
unconstitutional, the Court imposed “a new obligation prohibiting the application of our existing 
substantive law, [and thereby,] it modified Mississippi substantive law.”); Mantich, 842 N.W.2d at 
724 (“It is very clear that Miller announced a new rule . . . because the rule announced in Miller 
was not dictated by precedent existing at the time Mantich’s first degree murder conviction 
became final.”) (citing Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007)). 
 156.  Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 281. 
 157.  Jones, 122 So.3d at 702 (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351–52 (2004)). 
 158.  Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351–52 (2004) (quoting Bousley v. United States, 
523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Diatchenko, 1 N.E. at 281 
(explaining retroactive application of Miller “ensures that juvenile homicide offenders do not face 
a punishment that our criminal law cannot constitutionally impose on them” (citing Schriro, 542 
U.S. at 352)); see also Jones, 122 So.3d at 702 (“By prohibiting the imposition of a mandatory 
sentence, the new [Miller] obligation prevents ‘a significant risk that a [juvenile] . . . faces a 
punishment that the law cannot impose on him.’” (quoting Schriro, 542 U.S. at 351–52)). 
 159.  Tulloch v. Gerry, No. 12-CV-849, 2013 WL 4011621, at *6 (N.H. Super. Ct. July 29, 
2013) (Trial Order). 
 160.  Id. 
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substantive rule.”161  However, the court found Miller to be “more 
substantive than procedural,”162 because it made “a certain fact 
(consideration of mitigating evidence) essential to imposition of a 
sentence.”163  Despite some disagreement amongst these courts regarding 
whether Miller is purely or partially substantive, all agree that the substance 
outweighs the procedure, and that Miller must apply retroactively to cases 
on collateral review. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
In establishing a new rule than bans a certain punishment for a class of 
offenders, the Miller prohibition on mandatory JLWOP is substantive and 
should apply retroactively.  Courts finding otherwise improperly focused on 
Teague, both in its description of substantive rules and its concern with the 
finality of judgments.  Furthermore, a cursory reading of Miller itself 
indicates that it should apply retroactively: most of its cited authority has 
been applied retroactively, the dissent believed Miller to be retroactive, and 
the Court’s holding applied equally to both defendants—one of whom was 
before the Court on collateral review.  
A.  Reliance on a Strict Teague Analysis Is Misplaced Because 
Subsequent Decisions Have Expanded Teague’s Substantive 
Exception, and Under This Refinement, Miller Clearly Announced a 
Substantive Rule 
Miller created a substantive rule because it forbids a certain 
punishment for a class of offenders.164  Courts finding Miller to be 
procedural improperly focused on Teague v. Lane without addressing 
subsequent refinements to the Teague doctrine.  The Teague plurality 
described the substantive rule exception as covering rules placing certain 
conduct outside the scope of the criminal law, but the Court later explained 
this exception includes rules placing certain categories of individuals 
beyond the government’s power to punish.165 The Schriro Court further 
explained that substantive rules “apply retroactively because they 
                                                          
 161.  Nebraska v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 729 (Neb. 2014).  
 162.  Id. at 731. 
 163.  Id. at 730. 
 164.  See supra Part I.C.2.b. 
 165.  See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 n.4 (2004) (“We have sometimes referred 
to rules . . . [that place particular conduct or persons beyond the State’s power to punish] as falling 
under an exception to Teague’s bar on retroactive application of procedural rules . . . .”); see also 
Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 411 n.3 (2004) (“Rules that fall within what we have referred to as 
Teague’s first exception ‘are more accurately characterized as substantive rules not subject to 
[Teague’s] bar.’” (quoting Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352 n.4)). 
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necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant . . . faces a punishment 
that the law cannot impose upon him.”166  In other words, substantive rules 
protect defendants from receiving unconstitutional sentences, as the Miller 
rule does. 
Despite refinement to the Teague analysis—most importantly, Schriro 
v. Summerlin167—courts declaring that Miller does not apply retroactively 
relied more heavily on Teague than on Schriro.168  These courts reasoned 
that because Miller did not create “a categorical ban,”169 nor place certain 
conduct beyond the criminal-law-making authority, it pronounced a 
procedural rule.170  However, the modern meaning of Teague’s non-
retroactivity doctrine can only be understood by considering the Court’s 
language in Schriro.  Rather than focusing primarily on conduct, these 
courts should have focused on the class of offenders facing a particular 
punishment.171  Although these courts were correct that Miller did not 
categorically ban JLWOP, they failed to recognize that in prohibiting 
mandatory JLWOP sentences, Miller “alters . . . the punishments that may 
be imposed on juvenile homicide offenders.”172  In doing so, Miller’s rule 
“prevents ‘a significant risk that a [juvenile] . . . faces a punishment that the 
law cannot impose on him.’”173  Furthermore, as JLWOP and mandatory 
JLWOP entail different sentencing structures, the Miller Court did impose a 
categorical ban of sorts by outlawing all mandatory JLWOP schemes.  
                                                          
 166.  Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352 (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 167.  See Nebraska v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 723 (Neb. 2014) (“Since Teague, the Court 
has refined the retroactivity analysis.  The most significant refinement occurred in Schriro v. 
Summerlin.” (citing Schriro, 542 U.S. 348)). 
 168.  See Ex Parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66, 72–74 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (explaining those 
courts declaring Miller is not retroactive narrowly interpret Teague’s first exception, while courts 
declaring Miller is retroactive focus on Schriro v. Summerlin’s language that “[n]ew substantive 
rules include ‘constitutional determinations that place particular conduct or persons covered by the 
statute beyond the State’s power to punish.’” (quoting State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 115 
(Iowa 2013))). 
 169.  See supra text accompanying note 145. 
 170.  See supra Part I.C.2.a. 
 171.  Ex Parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d at 75 (“Miller is driven, first and foremost, by the 
conclusion that ‘children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.’” 
(quoting Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012))). 
 172.  Tulloch v. Gerry, No. 12-CV-849, 2013 WL 4011621, at *6 (N.H. Super. Ct. July 29, 
2013) (Trial Order) (“‘Miller mandates a sentencing range broader than that provided by statute 
for minors convicted of first degree murder who would could otherwise receive only natural life 
imprisonment.’  In this way, the Miller rule is substantive because it alters the range of outcomes 
of a criminal proceeding—or the punishments that may be imposed on juvenile homicide 
offenders.” (quoting Illinois v. Morfin, 981 N.E.2d 1010, 1022 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012))); see also Ex 
Parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d at 75 (“[Miller] provides a sentencing court with decision making 
authority where there once was none”).   
 173.  Jones v. Mississippi, 122 So.3d 698, 702 (2013). 
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Because the Miller rule ended unconstitutionally disproportionate 
sentencing schemes for a class of offenders, Miller neatly fits into the 
substantive rule exception.174 
B.  Because Miller Protects Juveniles from Receiving Unconstitutional 
Sentences, It Created a Substantive Rule That Must be Applied 
Retroactively 
As constitutional law scholar Erwin Chemerinsky explains, Miller did 
not merely change procedure but found the Constitution forbids a 
punishment.175  This is a “substantive change in the law which puts matters 
outside the scope of the government’s power.”176  As such, Miller should 
apply retroactively.177  This is so because the authority relied upon by the 
Miller Court consists of retroactively-applied substantive rules;178 the 
Miller Court did not distinguish between the two juveniles before the Court, 
despite the different procedural postures of their cases;179 and Chief Justice 
Roberts’s dissent reveals his understanding that Miller was intended to 
apply retroactively.180 
1.  Many of the Cases Cited by Miller Apply Retroactively, and 
Miller Should Receive the Same Treatment 
As the Supreme Court of Iowa explained, “[i]f a substantial portion of 
the authority used in Miller has been applied retroactively, Miller should 
logically receive the same treatment.”181  Because the proportional and 
individualized sentencing cases relied upon by the Miller Court announced 
retroactively-applied substantive rules, Miller should likewise apply 
retroactively. 
The Court’s proportional sentencing cases—Atkins, Roper, and 
Graham—which all “prohibit[] a certain category of punishment for a 
[certain] class of defendants because of their status or offense,” have each 
                                                          
 174.  The Miller Court itself explained that mandatory JLWOP sentencing schemes “pose[] too 
great a risk of disproportionate punishment.”  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).   
 175.  Erwin Chemerinsky, Juvenile Life-Without-Parole Case Means Courts Must Look at 
Mandatory Sentences, ABA JOURNAL (Aug. 8, 2012), 
http://www.abajournal.com/%20news/%20article/Chemerinsky_juvenile_life-without-
parole_case_means_courts_must_look_at_sen/. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  See infra part II.B.1. 
 179.  See infra part II.B.2. 
 180.  See infra part II.B.3. 
 181.  Iowa v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 116 (Iowa 2013). 
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been applied retroactively to cases on collateral review.182  Atkins, which 
held that imposing the death penalty on offenders with developmental 
disabilities is cruel and unusual, was decided on direct review, but has since 
been applied retroactively to cases on collateral review as a substantive 
rule.183  Roper, which relied heavily on Atkins and found that capital 
punishment for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment, became 
retroactive when it was announced because it was decided on collateral 
review.184  Graham, which struck down JLWOP sentences for non-
homicide crimes, has been applied retroactively to cases on collateral 
review in the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits.185  Like the Court’s 
proportional sentencing cases, the Court’s individualized sentencing cases 
have also been applied retroactively to cases on collateral review.186  Both 
Eddings v. Oklahoma and Lockett v. Ohio,187 which require that mitigating 
factors be considered before imposing the death penalty, were decided on 
direct review, and both have subsequently been applied retroactively.188 
Since much of the authority in Miller has been applied retroactively, 
the rules announced in these cases are substantive.  Like the proportional 
and individualized sentencing cases, Miller eliminates an entire class of 
offenders from receiving a certain punishment and requires the 
consideration of mitigating factors at sentencing.  Opponents of 
retroactivity point out that much of the retroactively-applied authority 
concerned the death penalty, and therefore, they argue, the retroactivity of 
                                                          
 182.  In re Sparks, 657 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 
330 (1989)).  
 183.  Brief of Juvenile Law Center, et. al., as Amici Curiae on Behalf of Petitioner at 8, In re 
Pendleton, 732 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2013) (No. 12-3996) [hereinafter Brief of Juvenile Law Center]; 
see also In re Sparks, 657 F.3d at 272 (citing, for example, Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330, 332 
(5th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins barring the execution of the mentally 
retarded has been given retroactive effect . . . .”)).  In fact, in Penry, decided before Atkins, the 
Court stated, “[I]f we held, as a substantive matter, that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the 
execution of mentally retarded persons . . . regardless of the procedures followed, such a rule 
would fall under the first exception to the general rule of nonretroactivity and would be applicable 
to defendants on collateral review.”  492 U.S. at 330. 
 184.  Brief of Juvenile Law Center, supra note 183, at 8; see also In re Sparks, 657 F.3d at 272 
(explaining Roper has been applied retroactively to cases on collateral review). 
 185.  See In re Evans, 449 Fed. Appx. 284 (4th Cir. 2011); In re Sparks, 657 F.3d at 262; 
Loggins v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1204, 1221 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 186.  Brief of Juvenile Law Center, supra note 183, at 9–10. 
 187.  438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion).  
 188.  Id. at 10; see also Shuman v. Wolff, 571 F. Supp. 213, 216 (D. Nev. 1983) (applying 
Eddings retroactively to a habeas petition); see also Jordan v. Arizona, 438 U.S. 911, 911-12 
(1978) (vacating a death penalty judgment and remanding to the Supreme Court of Arizona to 
proceed according to Lockett); Songer v. Wainwright, 769 F.2d 1488, 1489 (11th Cir. 1985) (per 
curiam) (“There is no doubt today . . . .  Lockett is retroactive.”). 
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those cases does not indicate Miller should be retroactive.189  However, the 
Miller Court explained that, “if . . . ‘death is different,’ children are 
different too.  Indeed, it is the odd legal rule that does not have some form 
of exception for children.”190  The fact that the Court’s earlier cases 
concerned capital punishment does not diminish Miller’s retroactivity.  
Because Miller announced a rule similar to those announced in both strands 
of precedent, Miller likewise announced a substantive rule that should apply 
retroactively to cases on collateral review.191 
2.  Courts Declaring Miller Is Not Retroactive Neglected to 
Mention That One of the Petitioners in Miller Was Before the 
Court on Collateral Review 
Because the Miller Court’s holding applied equally to Evan Miller, 
who was before the Court on direct review, as it did to Kuntrell Jackson, 
who was before the Court on collateral review, the Miller opinion itself 
indicates that it applies retroactively to cases like Jackson’s.192  When the 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari for Miller and Jackson in 
tandem, the Court did not distinguish between the two juveniles based on 
the status of their respective cases.193  Because Miller’s holding applied 
equally to both Miller and Jackson, it can be inferred that the Court 
intended Miller to apply retroactively,194 as a new rule becomes retroactive 
                                                          
 189.  Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19, Toca v. Louisiana, 135 S. Ct. 781 
(2014) (No. 14-6381) [hereinafter Opposition to Petition]. 
 190.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2470 (2012).   
 191.  Brief of Juvenile Law Center, supra note 183, at 10 (“Miller articulates a new rule typical 
of the two lines of precedent it relies on and should receive the same retroactive application.”).   
 192.  Jackson was convicted of capital felony murder and aggravated robbery in 2001 and was 
sentenced to life without parole.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461.  On appeal, Jackson did not challenge 
his sentence, and the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld his conviction.  Id.  After Roper v. 
Simmons, Jackson filed a state habeas corpus petition, challenging his sentence on Eighth 
Amendment grounds to no avail.  Id.  While Jackson appealed his petition denial, the United 
States Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida ruled JLWOP was unconstitutional for non-homicide 
crimes.  Id.  Jackson raised this argument in his appeal, but the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that 
“Roper and Graham were ‘narrowly tailored’ to their contexts,” and upheld Jackson’s petition 
denial.  Id.  Therefore, Jackson’s conviction was final by 2012, and he was before the Miller Court 
on collateral review.  
 193.  Id. at 2462–63. 
 194.  See, e.g., Louisiana v. Tate, 130 So.3d 829, 848 (La. 2013) (Johnson, C.J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he Court’s ruling in [Miller] fully supports that the Court’s ban on mandatory life without 
parole sentences is fully retroactive to all defendants on collateral review.”); Diatchenko v. Dist. 
Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 281 (Mass. 2013); Nebraska v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 
716, 731 (Neb. 2014) (“We also find it noteworthy that the Court applied the rule announced in 
Miller to Jackson, who was before the Court on collateral review.  Years ago, the Court stated that 
it would not announce or apply a new constitutional rule in a case before it on collateral review 
unless that rule would apply to all defendants on collateral review.”); Tulloch v. Gerry, 12-CV-
849, 2013 WL 4011621 *4 (N.H. Super. Ct. July 29, 2013) (Trial Order) (explaining that when the 
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“by the action taken by the Supreme Court in the case announcing the new 
rule.”195  Otherwise, courts would treat similarly situated defendants 
differently, which “hardly comports with the ideal of ‘administration of 
justice with an even hand.’”196  It would be “terribly unfair” to offenders 
similarly situated to Kuntrell Jackson, whose sentences became final before 
Miller, to remain in prison without the possibility of parole “based on the 
accident of the timing of the trial.”197  When the Miller Court remanded 
Jackson’s case for further proceedings consistent with the Miller holding, 
the Court made the rule retroactive to all cases on collateral review. 
3.  Chief Justice Roberts’s Dissent Suggests the Majority Intended 
Retroactive Application, and Concerns About Burdening the 
Judiciary with Resentencing Hearings Are Unwarranted 
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent suggests the Miller Court intended its 
decision to apply retroactively.  In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice 
Roberts stated that the majority’s opinion is “an invitation to overturn life 
without parole sentences imposed by juries and trial judges.”198  This points 
to his understanding that Miller was intended to apply retroactively.199  As 
the Supreme Court of Iowa pointed out, “the dissent would not have raised 
this concern if the Court did not believe its holding applied to cases on 
collateral review.”200  Therefore, the dissent indicates the Court intended 
Miller to apply retroactively. 
Like Chief Justice Roberts, opponents of retroactivity argue that it 
creates a strain on judicial resources.  If Miller applies retroactively, the 
defendants previously sentenced to mandatory JLWOP must be afforded 
resentencing or parole hearings.  This will create only a temporary burden, 
however, as a fixed number of defendants—only those who fit the specific 
criteria of Miller—can challenge the constitutionality of their previously-
imposed sentences.  Once these defendants are afforded new hearings, the 
burden on the judiciary will end. 
Furthermore, the temporary strain on judicial resources is negligible 
compared to the extensive cost of housing the thousands of juvenile inmates 
serving mandatory JLWOP sentences.  To illustrate, Pennsylvania houses 
                                                          
Miller Court considered Jackson’s case in tandem, “this was a retroactive application of the rule to 
a collateral review and, thus, implies an intent of applying the rule retroactively.”). 
 195.  Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 281 (quoting State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 114 (Iowa 
2013)). 
 196.  Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 315 (1989) (quoting Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 
U.S. 233, 247 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring)). 
 197.  Chemerinsky, supra note 175. 
 198.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2481 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).   
 199.  Tate, 130 So.3d at 848 (Johnson, C.J., dissenting). 
 200.  Iowa v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 116 (Iowa 2013).  
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472 juvenile inmates previously sentenced to mandatory JLWOP201 and 
spends approximately $42,339 per inmate annually.202  Of these 472 
juveniles, 18 were 13 or 14 years old when they were sentenced.203  If these 
juveniles live to be 76 years old (the average life expectancy of an 
American male),204 their life sentences will cost the State approximately 
$47,250,324 to $48,012,426.  This astonishing figure considers only the 
cost of incarcerating 18 juveniles and does not consider the other 454 
juveniles sentenced to die in Pennsylvania’s prisons. 
In addition to the obscene cost of incarcerating juvenile offenders, the 
Eighth Amendment provides an important protection that should not be 
overshadowed by judicial conservation concerns.  The Constitution tasks 
the judiciary with upholding the Constitution, but if courts refuse to apply 
Miller retroactively, such decisions “would allow the state to impose 
unconstitutional punishment[s] on some persons but not others, an 
intolerable miscarriage of justice.”205  When the Miller Court found an 
Eighth Amendment violation, “it inescapably deem[ed] the same 
punishment, albeit imposed before the decision, similarly cruel and 
unusual.”206  While preserving judicial resources is important, this concern 
should not prevent courts from putting an end to these unconstitutional 
sentences. 
Opponents of retroactivity also argue that resentencing hearings will 
be “problematic” due to a lack of certain psychological evidence.207  They 
claim that without a psychological examination prior to a defendant’s 
conviction, it would be impossible for resentencing courts to determine that 
defendant’s capacity for change and prospects of reform.208  Opponents are 
correct that determining a defendant’s prospects for reform before 
sentencing will be difficult.  However, there exists tangible evidence, such 
as a defendant’s accomplishments in prison, showing the actual occurrence 
                                                          
 201.  JLWOP: An Overview, supra note 5, at 1. 
 202.  Christian Henrichson & Ruth Delaney, The Price of Prisons: What Incarceration Costs 
Taxpayers, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 10 (July 20, 2012), available at 
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/price-of-prisons-updated-version-
021914.pdf. 
 203.  Cruel and Unusual: Sentencing 13- and 14-Year-Old Children to Die in Prison, EQUAL 
JUSTICE INITIATIVE 20 (Nov. 2007), available at 
http://www.eji.org/files/20071017cruelandunusual.pdf.  
 204.  Actuarial Life Table, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., (2010) 
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table4c6.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2015). 
 205.  Brief of Juvenile Law Center, supra note 183, at 20 (quoting Hill v. Synder, No. 10-
14568, 2013 WL 364198, at *2 (E.D. Mich. January 30, 2013)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 206.  Id. at 3. 
 207.  Opposition to Petition, supra note 189, at 20. 
 208.  Id. 
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of such reform.  Opponents argue that such evidence is irrelevant because 
Miller requires a sentencer to consider a defendant’s “youth and attendant 
characteristics” at the time of sentencing.209  The fact that offenders 
sentenced to JLWOP actually do change, however, despite there being no 
tangible benefits for doing so, reveals their great capacities for reform.  
JLWOP sentences mean “that good behavior and character improvement 
are immaterial, . . . that whatever the future might hold in store for the mind 
and spirit of [the convict], he will remain in prison for the rest of his 
days.”210  That juvenile defendants do change in such conditions speaks 
volumes to their capacities for reform.  Furthermore, the United States 
Supreme Court has stated post-sentencing conduct is relevant for 
resentencing purposes.211  Therefore, a lack of certain psychological 
evidence due to the unfortunate timing of a defendant’s sentencing should 
not prevent reformed offenders from being released. 
C.  Reliance on the Finality of Judgments and the Deterrent Effect of 
Criminal Law Is Irrelevant in Determining Miller’s Retroactivity 
Because Deterrence Theories Are Inapplicable to Juveniles 
Opponents of retroactivity argue that retroactive application of a new 
rule undermines the finality of judgments, and therefore, interferes with the 
deterrent effect of the criminal law.  Many of the courts that found Miller 
does not apply retroactively relied heavily on Teague’s language that 
retroactive application of constitutional rules “seriously undermines the 
principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal 
justice system.  Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its 
deterrent effect.”212  However, the Supreme Court has previously stated that 
typical penological justifications, including deterrence, do not apply to 
juveniles as they do to adults.213  It is highly unlikely that juveniles employ 
a cost-benefit analysis or consider potential punishments before engaging in 
criminal activity.214  They lack maturity, exhibit impetuosity, and are more 
                                                          
 209.  Id. at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 210.  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 70 (2010) (quoting Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944 
(Nev. 1989)). 
 211.  Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 571–72 (1984). 
 212.  Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989); see, e.g., Chambers v. Minnesota, 831 
N.W.2d 311, 324 (Minn. 2013) (“[W]e have consistently recognized the need to safeguard the 
important principles underlying the [Teague] doctrine, including finality”). 
 213.  See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012) (explaining the differences between 
juveniles and adults weaken penological justifications); Graham, 560 U.S at 71–73 (explaining 
penological justifications do not work for juvenile offenders); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
571 (2005) (“[I]t is unclear whether the death penalty has a significant or even measurable 
deterrent effect on juveniles”). 
 214.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 571–72. 
 2015] CRUEL AND UNUSUAL BEFORE AND AFTER 2012 1027 
easily influenced by negative forces and peer pressure, making them less 
likely to consider the consequences of their actions.215 
Outside forces have an enormous impact on juvenile behavior.  Youth 
is not just one’s chronological age; “[i]t is a time and condition of life when 
a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological 
damage.”216  The Sentencing Project, an organization dedicated to a fair and 
effective criminal justice system, conducted a study of juveniles sentenced 
to JLWOP and found that “79% witnessed violence in their homes; 40% 
had been enrolled in special education classes; [f]ewer than half were 
attending school at the time of their offense; [and] 47% were physically 
abused.”217  These juveniles lived in “horrific, crime-producing settings,”218 
at a time when they were most susceptible to negative influences.  As 
victims of their environments, these defendants should not be left to die in 
prison. 
Scientific studies have also revealed that deterrence theories are less 
applicable to juveniles than to adults.  Behavioral studies show that 
juveniles “often undervalue the true consequences of their actions.  Instead, 
adolescents, as a group, often value impulsivity, fun-seeking, and peer-
approval more than adults do.”219  Furthermore, the “executive area of the 
brain is one of the last parts of the brain to reach maturity.”220  Disruption in 
this area of the brain “may lead to impairments of foresight, strategic 
thinking, and risk management.”221  Therefore, juveniles are unlikely to be 
deterred from engaging in criminal conduct by the threat of punishment.  In 
fact, “research has failed to establish that the threat of adult criminal 
punishment . . . has had any deterrent effect on adolescent misconduct.”222 
Reliance on Teague’s language regarding finality and deterrence is 
misplaced due to the unique characteristics of juveniles.  As the court in 
Chambers v. Minnesota explained, when a new rule is substantive, “‘the 
Constitution itself deprives the State of the power to impose a certain 
penalty, and the finality and comity concerns’ underlying the retroactivity 
                                                          
 215.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465, 2475 (citing Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010)). 
 216.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 569. 
 217.  Slow to Act, supra note 108, at 4. 
 218.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569).  
 219.  Brief for the Am. Psychological Assoc., et. al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent 
at 6–7, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633) [hereinafter Brief for the Am. 
Psychological Assoc.]. 
 220.  Id. at 10. 
 221.  Id. 
 222.  Id. at 14 (citing Simon I. Singer & David McDowall, Criminalizing Delinquency: The 
Deterrent Effects of the New York Juvenile Offender Law, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 521, 529–32 
(1988); Eric L. Jensen & Linda K. Metsger, A Test of the Deterrent Effect of Legislative Waiver 
on Violent Juvenile Crime, 40 CRIME & DELINQ. 96, 100–02 (1994)). 
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doctrine ‘have little force.’”223  As the characteristics of juveniles render 
finality and deterrence inapposite, the concerns underlying Teague’s non-
retroactivity doctrine are irrelevant in determining Miller’s  retroactivity. 
D.  Toca v. Louisiana: A Missed Opportunity for the Court to Declare 
Miller Applies Retroactively 
Because courts have been disparate in their conclusions regarding 
Miller’s retroactivity, the Court granted certiorari on December 12, 2014 to 
answer this important question.224  The Court in Toca v. Lousiana agreed to 
consider: first, whether the Miller rule applies retroactively to George Toca, 
a prisoner sentenced to mandatory JLWOP, and second, whether “a federal 
question [is] raised by a claim that a state collateral review court 
erroneously failed to find a Teague exception.”225  However, Mr. Toca was 
released from prison on January 29, 2015 after entering a plea agreement 
with the prosecutor.226  As such, his case is moot and has been dismissed.227  
That the Court granted certiorari to Mr. Toca reveals the importance of 
resolving the issue of Miller’s retroactivity.  Hopefully, another opportunity 
to resolve the issue will present itself soon.228 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Miller v. Alabama announced a substantive rule because it protects 
juveniles, as a class of offenders, from receiving a sentence that the 
government cannot impose upon them.  Courts declaring otherwise ignored 
                                                          
 223.  Chambers v. Minnesota, 831 N.W.2d 311, 326 (Minn. 2013) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 224.  Toca v. Louisiana, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/toca-v-
louisiana/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2015). 
 225.  Lyle Denniston, Court to Look Again at Juvenile Life Sentences, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 
12, 2014), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/12/court-to-look-again-at-juvenile-life-sentences/. 
 226.  George Toca Freed After Nearly 31 Years of Wrongful Incarceration, THE INNOCENCE 
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visited Feb. 8, 2015). 
 227.  Lyle Denniston, Juvenile Sentencing Case to End, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 3, 2015), 
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content/uploads/2015/02/14-6381-dismissal-motion.pdf.  
 228.  As luck would have it, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on March 23, 2015 in 
Montgomery v. Louisiana.  Montgomery v. Louisiana, 2015 WL 1280236 (U.S. Mar. 23, 2015) 
(No. 14-28).  The Court agreed to consider “[w]hether Miller v. Alabama adopts a new substantive 
rule that applies retroactively on collateral review to people condemned as juveniles to die in 
prison.”  Montgomery v. Louisiana, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/montgomery-v-louisiana/ (last visited April 12, 2015).  The Court also requested that 
the parties brief and argue whether the Court has jurisdiction to determine whether the Supreme 
Court of Louisiana properly refused to apply Miller retroactively in this case.  Id.  
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important refinements to the Teague doctrine, while disregarding the unique 
characteristics of youth that make deterrence concerns inapplicable to 
juveniles.  Refusing to apply Miller retroactively is at odds with modern 
notions of decency, scientific proof that juveniles are different, and even-
handed justice.  Continuing to incarcerate these individuals wastes an 
enormous amount of human potential and taxpayer money.  As a vulnerable 
group subjected to horrific settings, completely outside of their control, 
defendants sentenced to mandatory JLWOP should not be left to die in 
prison. 
 
